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The Max-Min-Min Principle of Product Differentiation
1. Introduction
A primary goal of the theory of product differentiation is the determination of market
structure and conduct of firms that can choose the specifications of their products besides
choosing output and price. Traditional models of product differentiation and marketing have
focused on products that are defined by one characteristic only.1 One-characteristic models are
sufficient for the understanding of the interaction between product specification and price. The
main question in this setting is the degree of product differentiation at equilibrium -- does the
acclaimed "Principle of Minimum Differentiation" (stating that product specifications will be very
similar at equilibrium) hold? Intensive research on this question has conclusively determined that
the Principle of Minimum Differentiation does not hold for any well-behaved model.2 Thus, as
long as we confine product differentiation to one dimension, there will be significant differences
in the equilibrium product specifications. However, most goods are defined by a long vector of
product attributes, and a priori, the failure of the Principle of Minimum Differentiation is not
clear in multi-attribute competition.
The Principle of Minimum Differentiation fails in one-dimensional models because
product similarity increases competition, and reduces prices and profits. In multi-attribute
models, different possibilities emerge: products can be significantly differentiated along all
dimensions (max-max-...-max differentiation) or products may have quite different degrees of
product differentiation in different dimensions (for example, in three dimensions, maximum
differentiation in one dimension and minimum differentiation on the rest, or max-min-min). The
logic of the results of the one-dimensional model is not sufficient to show which of these
configurations will be the equilibrium in multi-attribute settings.
The present paper determines the equilibrium configuration in a standard two-dimensional
model as max-min. That is, we establish that firms will try to maximally differentiate in one
dimension and minimally differentiate in another. We call this the Principle of Maximum-
Minimum Differentiation. We further show that when products can be differentiated in three
2dimensions, firms differentiate maximally in one dimension and minimally in the remaining two.
We call this the Principle of Max-Min-Min Differentiation.
In our setup, the disutility of distance function has different weights in each dimension.
These weights measure the importance that consumers place in each attribute of the product. We
find that the nature and number of equilibria depend crucially on these weights. For example,
in the two attribute model, when consumers care a lot about the attribute of the first dimension
(and therefore place a high weight on it), the max-min equilibrium results where firms maximally
differentiate in the first dimension only. Similarly, when the consumers place a high weight on
the second attribute, the min-max equilibrium results, where firms maximally differentiate in the
second dimension only. When the weights are roughly comparable, both equilibria exist.
The same pattern holds in the three-characteristics model. The max-min-min equilibrium,
where firms maximally differentiate in the first dimension only, occurs when the weight of the
first attribute is large. When, in addition, the weight of the second attribute is significant as well,
the min-max-min equilibrium occurs as well. When all weights are comparable, the min-min-max
equilibrium occurs in addition to the previous two.
The qualitative relationship between weights and type and number of equilibria is very
important because it can be used to show a seamless transition from Hotelling’s one-characteristic
paradigm to models of two and three characteristics. The original one-dimensional model of
Hotelling can be embedded in a two dimensional model where the weight placed by the
consumers in the second attribute is negligible. We show that, if this second weight is small, the
equilibrium of the two-dimensional model will have maximal differentiation in the first
dimension, and no differentiation in the second dimension (max-min). Adding a third attribute
that the consumers do not consider important preserves the equilibrium pattern, which now
becomes max-min-min. Only when the second weight is significant, a second equilibrium (min-
max-min) appears.
3The qualitatively different degrees of product differentiation in different dimensions at the
equilibrium of the two- and three-dimensional models, raises the possibility that wrong
conclusions will be drawn from empirical observation that does not fully cover all dimensions.
For example, in three dimensions, if the maximal differentiation in one dimension remains
unobserved, the equilibrium may seem to be one of uniformly minimal differentiation. However,
if the only dimension observed is the one about which consumers care the most, then maximal
differentiation will be observed. This raises serious concerns about the validity of empirical
observation of degrees of product differentiation, since empirical observation is typically
incomplete.
All our results are established in a framework of a two-stage game, in the first stage of
which, firms simultaneously choose locations, while in the second stage they simultaneously
choose prices. Thus, the equilibria we describe are subgame perfect, and firms anticipate the
effects of changes in their locations to the equilibrium prices. Intuitively, this game structure
captures the fact that prices are more flexible (easier to change) in the short run, while product
specifications are not; pricing decisions often are made when product specifications cannot be
changed.3
In the existing literature, few papers have allowed determination of product specifications
in two characteristics, notably Economides (1993), Neven and Thisse (1990) and Vandenbosch
and Weinberg (1995).4 Neven and Thisse (1990) investigate product quality and variety
decisions of two firms in a two dimensional product space. They combine the "horizontal"
differentiation (ideal point) and "vertical" differentiation (vector attribute) paradigms, and
investigate subgame-perfect equilibria for product and price decisions in a duopoly. Vandenbosch
and Weinberg (1994) analyze a model of two-dimensional vertical (quality) differentiation.
After a working paper version of our article had been circulating, we discovered that
Tabuchi (1994) had independently derived similar results for a model of two-dimensional variety
differentiation. The main difference between Tabuchi’s model and ours is that we use weights
4on the disutilities of distance in each attribute and consumers’ ideal points are distributed on a
square; in contrast, Tabuchi has no weights but allowed for a rectangular shape of fixed area.
We show that there is a formal equivalence between the two models, i.e., a rectangle tall in the
first dimension in Tabuchi is equivalent to a high preference weight of the first dimension in our
model. Nevertheless, the intuitive interpretation of the results is quite different. Further, we
provide results in the three-dimensional model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the market
environment. In Section 3, we analyze the two dimensional market and derive the price and
position equilibria. We extend the model to three dimensions in Section 4. Finally in Section
5, we conclude with a discussion of our results and provide directions for future research.
2. The Model
We describe the model in general terms that are relevant for markets of either two or
three attributes. We assume that there are two firms, labelled 1 and 2, and each offers a single
n-attribute product. The position of a product i can be represented in n-dimensional attribute
space by an n-tuple, θi ∈ [0, 1]n. The elements of θi give the position of the product on each
of the n attributes. Each consumer is represented by an ideal point which gives the coordinates
of the product which the consumer prefers the most if all products were sold at the same price.
A consumer j can therefore be represented by the vector of coordinates of his ideal point, Aj
∈ [0, 1]n.
Each consumer’s utility is a decreasing function of the square of the weighted Euclidean
distance between the product specifications and the consumer’s ideal point.5 Formally, a
consumer of type Aj derives the following utility from buying one unit of product i at price
pi:
U(Aj; θi; pi) = Y - w θi - Aj 2 - pi. (1)
5Y is a positive constant, the same for all consumers and assumed to be high enough so that all
consumers buy a differentiated product. w is a vector of weights that the consumers attach to
attributes. We assume that the w vector is same across all individuals.
Consumers’ ideal points are distributed uniformly over the attribute space; consumers also
possess perfect information about brand positions and prices in the market. Firms maximize
profits and have zero marginal costs of production.6 Firms compete by following a two-stage
process. In the first stage, they simultaneously choose product positions. Once these are
determined, they simultaneously choose prices in the second stage. We seek subgame-perfect
equilibria of the game implied by this framework. Thus, firms anticipate the impact of location
decisions on equilibrium prices. Given this basic model structure, we analyze next the two-
dimensional market in detail.
3. The Two Dimensional Model
3.1 Demand Formulation
In two dimensions, the joint space of consumers ideal points and products locations is a
unit square. A product i is represented by the vector Vi = (xi, yi), whereas an arbitrary consumer
can be identified by the address (a, b). Without loss of generality, we assume that y2 ≥ y1 and
x2 ≥ x1. A consumer’s utility for product i takes the form
Ui(a, b; xi, yi, pi) = Y - w1(a - xi)2 - w2(b - yi)2 - pi for i = 1, 2. (2)
The demand for product i is generated by consumers who obtain greater utility from it
than from the other product. The locus of consumers who are indifferent between brands 1 and
2 satisfies U1(a, b; x1, y1, p1) = U2(a, b; x2, y2, p2), which is equivalent to
b(a) = [(p2 - p1) + S - 2aw1X]/[2w2Y]
where S = w1(x22 - x12) + w2(y22 - y12), X = x2 - x1, and Y = y2 - y1. This represents a straight
line which partitions the total market (the unit square) into two demand areas for the firms.
6Given our assumptions regarding the product positions, the area below the separating line
represents firm 1’s demand and the area above it represents firm 2’s demand. The slope of the
separating line (b-line) is independent of the prices, but the intercept is not. The location of the
line within the unit square depends upon the price difference, p1 - p2, between the two firms.
When firm 1 increases its price (or firm 2 decreases its price), the separating line shifts down
reducing the market area for firm 1. Figure 1 shows the cases of scenario A that arise when
∂b/∂a < 1 ⇔ w1X < w2Y, i.e., the weighted difference in positions along attribute 2 is greater
than the weighted difference in positions along attribute 1. Similarly, scenario B arises when
w2Y < w1X.
The demand for firm 1, D1, is obtained by integrating the b(a) line over the appropriate
range of a. Since consumers always buy one product or the other, D2 = 1 - D1. Assuming zero
costs, profits are Π1(p1, p2; x1, y1, x2, y2) = p1D1, Π2(p1, p2; x1, y1, x2, y2) = p2D2.
3.1.1 Scenario A
We first analyze scenario A and show how the demand expressions and profit functions
depend upon the relative price difference between the firms. We fix the positions of both brands
and the price of firm 2, p2. As price p1 decreases, the b line that separates the market areas shifts
upward. The three lines in Figure 1 represent cases 1A, 2A, and 3A respectively. The demand
expressions for each case are summarized below. We label the demand expressions for firm i
in case k as Dik.
Case 1A: When 0 ≤ (p2 - p1 + S) ≤ 2w1X, the demand of firm 1 is D11A ≡ (p2 - p1 +
S)2/(8w1w2XY).
Case 2A: When 2w1X ≤ (p2 - p1 + S) ≤ 2w2Y, the demand of firm 1 is D12A ≡ (p2 - p1 + S -
w1X)/(2w2Y).
Case 3A: When 2w2Y ≤ (p2 - p1 + S) ≤ 2(w1X + w2Y), the demand of firm 1 is D13A ≡ (p2 -
p1 + S - w1X -w2Y)2/(8w1w2XY).
73.1.2 Scenario B
In Scenario B, the product positions satisfy w1Y < w2X; we again have three cases for the
demand. These demand expressions and price domains are summarized below.
Case 1B: When 0 ≤ (p2 - p1 + S) ≤ 2w2Y, the demand of firm 1 is D11B = D11A.
Case 2B: When 2w2Y ≤ p2 - p1 + S ≤ 2w1X, the demand of firm 1 is D12B ≡ (p2 - p1 + S -
w2Y)/(2w1X).
Case 3B: When 2w1X ≤ (p2 - p1 + S) ≤ 2(w1X + w2Y), the demand of firm 1 is D13B = D13A.
It is easy to check that the demand expressions are continuous across the different price domains.
The different segments of D2 can be derived in a manner analogous to that for D1.
3.2 Price Equilibrium
In this section, we show that a unique non-cooperative price equilibrium exists for any
pair of product positions (chosen by the two firms in the first stage) in both two and three
dimensions, and we calculate the equilibrium prices.
The main step in proving existence is in establishing that each firms’ profit function is
quasi-concave in its own price. The concavity properties of the profit function depend upon the
choice of the utility function and the distribution of consumer preferences. Caplin and Nalebuff
(1991) have established twin restrictions on utility functions and preference distributions that
guarantee existence of price equilibria for a number of firms with n-dimensional product
specifications. Our utility function (2) is a special case of the general utility function of Caplin
and Nalebuff (Assumption A1, p. 29). In addition, the uniform distribution of consumer
preferences is concave and confirms with the ρ-concavity conditions employed in Caplin and
Nalebuff. Hence our model satisfies assumptions A1 and A2, of Caplin and Nalebuff. Then
from their Theorems 1 and 2, a price equilibrium exists in our model, for any pair of positions.
Since the profit function is twice differentiable and the distribution of preferences is concave
(and therefore log-concave), Caplin and Nalebuff’s uniqueness result (Proposition 6, p. 42)
8ensures that the price equilibrium is unique for each pair of product positions. What remains is
to calculate the equilibrium prices for each pair of locations. This has to be done for each case
in each scenario. The equilibrium price functions are obtained by solving the first order
conditions of the profit functions ∂Π1/∂p1 = ∂Π2/∂p2 = 0 and checking the second order
conditions for the positive price solution.7 We describe these equilibria in the appendix of an
unabridged working paper version of this article available from the authors upon request.
We now illustrate the relationship between our two dimensional model and Tabuchi’s
(1994) formulation.8 Tabuchi models location-price equilibria in a rectangular product space,
but assumes that both attributes are equally important for consumers. We assume that the two
dimensional product space is a unit square, but associate different weights along the two
dimensions. We find that the demand and profit expressions as well as the price equilibria are
equivalent in these two formulations via a set of transformations on the product coordinates and
attribute weights. Specifically, let (x1, y1, x2, y2) and (w1, w2) be the product coordinates and
attribute weights, respectively, in our formulation, and let (X1, Y1, X2, Y2) be the product
coordinates in Tabuchi’s model, where consumers are distributed uniformly in the rectangular
product space [0, c] x [0, 1/c]. The transformation that establishes equivalence is (x1 = X1/c,
x2 = X2/c, y1 = cY1 and y2 = cY2; w1 = c2, and w2 = 1/c2). Thus, a less wide and more tall
rectangle in Tabuchi is formally equivalent to our unit square with more weight given to the
second (i.e., the vertical) characteristic. Since the demand and profit expressions are the same,
so are the equilibrium prices for equivalent positions in the two models.
3.3 Product Equilibria
We now establish the subgame-perfect equilibrium positions of firms. With subgame-
perfection, firms anticipate the equilibrium prices in the subgames. We can write profits in the
locations stage as
9Πi(x1, y1, x2, y2) ≡ Πi(p1*(x1, y1, x2, y2), p2*(x1, y1, x2, y2), x1, y1, x2, y2), i = 1, 2.
Thus, a change in location has two effects on profits: a direct effect, and an indirect effect
through prices.9
Depending on the ratio of the weights w ≡ w2/w1, there are either one or two location
equilibria (and their mirror images). At all equilibria, there is minimum differentiation in one
dimension and maximum differentiation in the other. The first candidate equilibrium is (x1*,
y1*) = (1/2, 0), (x2*, y2*) = (1/2, 1), i.e., firms are located in the middle of the horizontal segments
of the box, implying minimum differentiation in x and maximum differentiation in y. We call
this the min-max equilibrium. The second candidate equilibrium is (x1**, y1**) = (0, 1/2), (x2**, y2**)
= (1, 1/2), i.e., firms are located at the middle points of the vertical segments of the box,
implying minimum differentiation in y and maximum differentiation in x. We call this the max-
min equilibrium.
We find that for w < 0.406 only the max-min equilibrium [(x1**, y1**) = (0, 1/2), (x2**, y2**)
= (1, 1/2)] exists; for w > 1/0.406 = 2.46, only the min-max equilibrium [(x1*, y1*) = (1/2, 0),
(x2*, y2*) = (1/2, 1)] exists; and for 0.406 < w < 2.46, both the max-min and the min-max
equilibria exist.10 The nature of the best responses underlying these equilibria are shown in
Figure 2. The arrows in these gradient plots show the direction in which the profit function of
firm 1 increases, when firm 2 is located at (1/2, 1). Remembering the definition of w, w =
w1/w2, note that the min-max equilibrium exists when w2 is relatively large, and similarly, the
max-min equilibrium exists when w1 is relatively large. When w1 and w2 are roughly of
similar magnitude, as in Figure 2(c) both equilibria exist. When one weight is much larger than
the other, there is only one equilibrium where maximal differentiation occurs in the dimension
that corresponds to the higher weight.
At both equilibria, the firms share the market equally. At the first equilibrium, prices for
both brands are p1 = p2 = w2 and profits are Π1 = Π2 = w2/2; at the second equilibrium, prices
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are p1 = p2 = w1 while profits are Π1 = Π2 = w1/2. Therefore, when the weights differ, and
when both equilibria exist, both firms are better off at the equilibrium that corresponds to
maximal differentiation in the product dimension for which the consumers care most. Firms are
likely to coordinate to that equilibrium.
Positions implying maximal differentiation on both attributes (max-max) are not
equilibrium positions, even though both firms have profits equal to the equilibrium profits when
they are maximally differentiated on both attributes. Given that its opponent has located at the
corner of the square, a firm has a unilateral incentive to deviate from the diametrically opposite
corner and move inwards thereby increasing its market share. Such an inward move in one
attribute is based on incentives that are analogous to those in the one-dimensional Hotelling
(1929) model with linear transportation costs. In that model, profits are equal for any symmetric
locations, but each firm had a unilateral incentive to move toward the other firm. The two
opposing forces, one driving firms apart due to price competition, and the other bringing them
together, due to market share dynamics, are resolved in favor of market share forces. In contrast,
in the one-dimensional model with quadratic costs, where again the opposing forces operate on
a single attribute, the resolution is in favor of price competition, and the equilibrium is at
maximal differentiation. When there are two or more dimensions, the two opposing forces
resolve along different dimensions. Due to the dominance of price competition, we see maximal
differentiation along the most important attribute, whereas the market share effect encourages
firms to occupy central positions on the less important attribute.
An example of a product category that exhibits max-min differentiation is ice cream.
Consider a single flavor, say chocolate. Most of the important differences among brands are
dictated by their fat and sugar contents. These characteristics govern both flavor and how healthy
(or perhaps more accurately unhealthy) each brand is. A trip to the grocery store with a casual
inspection of the nutrition labels will reveal that the amount of fat per 100 gram serving
(approximately 1/2 to 3/4 cup, depending on the ice cream’s density) varies from none for the
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fat-free brands to about 22 grams for the super premium brands (e.g. Haagen Daas). Yet all
brands tend to have in the neighborhood of 25 grams of carbohydrates or sugar.
It is natural to ask whether this pattern of equilibria generalizes to higher dimensions.
In higher dimensions, will competitors differentiate on more than one attribute or continue to
differentiate only on one attribute? Will we continue to get just two equilibria or will the number
of equilibria depend on the dimensionality of the product space? To answer these questions, we
analyze a three-dimensional market in the next section.
4. The Three Dimensional Model
4.1 Demand Formulation
In three dimensions, the joint space of consumers and product locations is a unit cube.
A product i is represented by the vector θi = (xi, yi, zi) whereas an ideal point for consumer j
is denoted by Aj = (a, b, c). We continue to assume that x2 ≥ x1, y2 ≥ y1, z2 ≥ z1, and that the
attribute weights w1, w2, w3, are constant across consumers. Thus, the utility of consumer Aj
when he buys one unit of product θi is
Ui(a, b, c; xi, yi, zi) = Y - w1(a - xi)2 - w2(b - yi)2 - w3(c - zi)2 - pi; i = 1, 2.
The market areas are given by three-dimensional regions of the cube separated by a plane,
rather than two-dimensional regions of a square separated by a line as in the two-dimensional
case we discussed earlier. The locus of consumers on this plane, who are indifferent between
buying from either firm, is given by
c(a, b) = (p2 - p1 + S - 2aw1X - 2bw2Y)/(2w3Z)
where S = w1(x22 - x12) + w2(y22 - y12) + w3(z22 - z12), X = x2 - x1, Y = y2 - y1, Z = z2 - z1, and
(a, b) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] are the coordinates of the consumer in the first two dimensions. The
region below (above) the plane is composed of customers of product 1 (2). As before, when firm
12
1 decreases its price p1 (or firm 2 increases p2), the plane shifts upwards, thereby increasing
firm 1’s demand, D1. The demand for firm 1 is obtained by integrating the c(a, b) plane over
the appropriate range of a and b. Since consumers buy one product or the other, D2 = 1 - D1.
As the demand expressions for the two firms depend upon the position and orientation of the
separating plane, the demand expressions change whenever the indifference plane shifts its
location and passes through a corner of the unit cube. To capture the dependence of the demand
expressions on the relationship between prices and firm locations, we first distinguish between
twelve scenarios that are characterized by the locations of the firms.
We first document all twelve scenarios. The defining features of these scenarios are:
Scenario 1A: w1X ≤ w2Y ≤ (w1X + w2Y) ≤ w3Z;
Scenario 1B: w1X ≤ w2Y ≤ w3Z ≤ (w1X + w2Y);
Scenario 2A: w1X ≤ w3Z ≤ (w1X + w3Z) ≤ w2Y;
Scenario 2B: w1X ≤ w3Z ≤ w2Y ≤ (w1X + w3Z);
Scenario 3A: w2Y ≤ w1X ≤ (w1X + w2Y) ≤ w3Z;
Scenario 3B: w2Y ≤ w1X ≤ w3Z ≤ (w1X + w2Y);
Scenario 4A: w2Y ≤ w3Z ≤ (w2Y + w3Z) ≤ w1X;
Scenario 4B: w2Y ≤ w3Z ≤ w1X ≤ (w2Y + w3Z);
Scenario 5A: w3Z ≤ w1X ≤ (w1X + w3Z) ≤ w2Y;
Scenario 5B: w3Z ≤ w1X ≤ w2Y ≤ (w1X + w3Z);
Scenario 6A: w3Z ≤ w2Y ≤ (w2Y + w3Z) ≤ w1X;
Scenario 6B: w3Z ≤ w2Y ≤ w1X ≤ (w2Y + w3Z).
We now focus on the dependence of the demand expressions and profit functions on the
relative price difference between the firms. Within each scenario (configuration of attribute
weights and product positions), we identify seven cases that are distinguished by the difference
in the prices p2 - p1. We now present the demand expressions originating in Scenario 1A, and
discuss the other scenarios in the Appendix to this paper.
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In Scenario 1A, for any fixed price p2, if p1 is such that p2 - p1 + S ≤ 0, then firm
1 has non-positive demand. In order to calculate the demand segment D11A, we need to define
the region of integration. The separating plane intersects the (a, b) plane in a straight line given
by blimit = (p2 - p1 + S - 2aw1X)/(2w2Y). This straight line, blimit, intersects the a axis at
point aint = (p2 - p1 + S)/(2w1X). Now, when p1 is reduced so that 0 ≤ L ≤ 2X, where L =
(p2 - p1 + S), the separating plane intersects all three axes as in case 1, Figure 3, and we have:




c(a, b) db da = L3/H,
where H = 48w1w2w3XYZ.
When p1 is further decreased, the separating plane passes through the corner (1, 0, 0)
of the product space and as shown in case 2, Figure 3, and we have:




c(a, b) db da = D11A - (L - w1X)3/H
When p1 is further reduced, the plane while moving up crosses the corner (0, 1, 0) and
we have:




c(b, a) db da + ∫1
aint1 ∫0
blimit
c(b, a) db da = D12A - (L - 2w2Y)3/H,
where aint1 = (L - 2w2Y)/(2w1X) is the intercept of the blimit line with the line b = 1.
On further reduction in p1, we have case 4a, Figure 3, where the indifference plane
intersects the vertical faces of the unit cube:




c(b, a) db da = D13A + (L - 2(w1X + w2Y))3/H,
which simplifies further to a linear function in p1 given by
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D14A = (L - w1X - w2Y)/(2w3Z).
When p1 is further reduced so that the separating plane moves past the (0, 0, 1) corner,
we have:
Case 5A: when 2w3Z ≤ L ≤ 2(w1X+w3Z),
D15A = ∫0
aint2 ∫0
blimit1 db da +∫0




c(b, a) db da
where blimit1 = (L - 2aw1X - 2w3Z)/(2w2Y) is the line of intersection of c(a, b) with the plane
c = 1. aint2 is obtained by substituting b = 0 in blimit1. Hence, aint2 = (L - 2w3Z)/(2w1X),
whereas, bint2 = (L - 2w3Z)/(2w2Y), is obtained by setting a = 0 in blimit1. The demand
expression then is
D15A = D14A - (L - 2w3Z)3/H.
Next, on further reduction in p1, the plane passes past (1, 0, 1) and we get:
Case 6A: when p1 satisfies 2(w1X + w3Z) ≤ L ≤ 2(w2Y + w3Z), we have
D16A = ∫0
1 ∫0
blimit1 db da + ∫0
1 ∫1blimit1 c(b, a) db da
which reduces to
D16A = D15A + (L - 2(w1X + w2Y))3/H.
Finally, we calculate the point of intersection of blimit1 with the line c = 1 and b =
1 to get aint3 = (L - 2(w2Y + w3Z))/(2w1X). Now, as shown in case 7, Figure 3, we have:
Case 7A: when 2(w2Y + w3Z) ≤ L ≤ 2(w1X + w2Y + w3Z), the demand is given by
D17A = ∫0
aint3 ∫0
1 db da + ∫1
aint3 ∫0
blimit1 db da + ∫1
aint3 ∫
1
blimit1 c(b, a) db da.
This reduces to
D17A = D16A + (L - 2(w2Y + w3Z))3/H.
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This completes Scenario 1A. The different segments of D2 can be derived in a manner
analogous to that for D1. It is easy to show that all demand expressions are continuous across
the different price domains (cases).
4.2 Price Equilibrium
Following the arguments based on Caplin and Nalebuff given for the two dimensional
model in section 3.2, it is apparent that a unique price equilibrium exists for each set of product
positions in three dimensions. We therefore begin by describing the equilibrium price
expressions within each case of scenario 1A.
Case 1A: The demand for firm 1 is given by D11A and for firm 2 is given by D21A = 1 -
D11A. The first order conditions yield three solutions. We eliminate infeasible solutions to obtain
the equilibrium prices,
p11A*= (S2 + KS + K2)/(15K), p21A*= (4S2 - 11KS + 4K2)/(15K)
where K = (S3 + 600 w1w2w3XYZ + 20[3w1w2w3XYZ(S3 + 300 w1w2w3XYZ)]1/2)1/3.
The above equilibrium prices apply to product positions which satisfy 0 ≤ p21A* - p11A*
+ S < 2w1X. Positions that result in case 1A also satisfy w1X ≤ w2Y ≤ (w1X + w2Y) ≤ w3Z.
We define the pairs of locations that satisfy these conditions (and therefore result in case 1A)
as R1A. For fixed values of the weights, R1A is a subset of the six-dimensional hypercube [0,
1]6. The condition p21A* - p11A* + S ≥ 0 is always true, whereas p21A* - p11A* + S < 2w1X is
satisfied if
10w12X2 > 12w2w3YZ + 3w1SX (G1)
Case 2A: The first order conditions yield two solutions. After eliminating the one that
gives negative prices , the equilibrium prices are:
p12A* = (9(S - w1X)(4w2w3YZ - w12X2) + Jw12X2 + 108Jw2w3YZ)/(24(12w2w3YZ - w1X2))
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p22A* = (9(S - w1X)(-20w2w3YZ + w12X2) - Jw12X2 + 972Jw2w3YZ)/(24(12w2w3YZ - w1X2))
where J = (9S2 - 18w1SX - 15w12X2 + 288w2w3YZ)1/2.
Substitution of equilibrium prices in the defining condition of case 2A, results in 2w1X ≤ p22A* -
p12A* + S < 2w2Y. The LHS of this inequality is satisfied when condition (G1) fails, i.e., when
(10w12X2 ≤ 12w2w3YZ + 3w1SX), whereas the RHS of the inequality is satisfied when
3S + J < 24w2Y - 9w1X. (G2)
These two conditions, in conjunction with w1X ≤ w2Y ≤ (w1X + w2Y) ≤w3Z, define region R2A,
of location pairs for which p12A* and p22A* define an equilibrium.
Case 3A: The equilibrium prices can be obtained by solving the system of equations
below:
(p1 + p2)M + 1 = 0, p1M + (p2 - p1 + S - w1X - w2Y)/(2w3Z) - N3/(48w1w2w3XYZ) = 0,
where N = (p2 - p1 + S - 2w1X - 2w2Y) and M = N2/(16w1w2w3XYZ) - 1/(2w3Z).
We were unable to obtain closed form solutions to this set of equations. The equilibrium
prices for this case apply to product locations which satisfy 2w2Y ≤ (p23A* - p13A* + S) < 2(w1X
+ w2Y). The LHS for the above inequality is satisfied when (G2) fails and the RHS is satisfied
when
4w1X + 4w2Y - 2w3Z > S. (G3)
These conditions along with w1X ≤ w2Y ≤ (w1X + w2Y) ≤w3Z, define the region R3A of
product coordinates for which the above equations yield equilibrium prices
Case 4A: Equilibrium prices are:
p14A* = (S - w1X - w2Y + 2w3Z)/3, p24A* = (-S + w1X + w2Y + 4w3Z)/3
17
Substitution of equilibrium prices in the defining condition of case 4A, results in 2(w1X + w2Y)
≤ p24A* - p14A* + S < 2w3Z. The LHS of this inequality is satisfied when condition (G3) fails, i.e.,
(4(w1X + w2Y) -2w3Z ≤ S), whereas the RHS is satisfied when
S < 4w3Z - 2(w1X + w2Y). (G4)
These two conditions, along with w1X ≤ w2Y ≤ (w1X + w2Y) ≤w3Z, define region R4A.
Case 5A: The equilibrium prices can be obtained by solving the system of equations
below:
(p1 + p2)B + 1 = 0; p1B + (p2 - p1 + S - w1X - w2Y)/(2w3Z) - A3/(48w1w2w3XYZ) = 0
where A = (p2 - p1 + S - 2w3Z) and B = A2/(16w1w2w3XYZ) - 1/(2w3Z).
We were unable to obtain closed form solutions for this set of equations. The equilibrium prices
for this case apply to product locations which satisfy 2w3Z ≤ (p25A* - p15A* + S) < 2(w1X + w3Z).
The LHS for the above inequality is satisfied when (G4) fails and the RHS is satisfied when
3S - E > 15w1X + 16w3Z - 18w2Y. (G5)
These conditions, together with w1X ≤ w2Y ≤ (w1X + w2Y) ≤w3Z, define the region R5A of
product coordinates for which the above equations yield equilibrium prices.
Case 6A: The first order conditions yield two solutions. After eliminating the one with
negative prices we have the following equilibrium prices:
p16A* = (9I(20w2w3YZ - w12X2) - Ew12X2 + 972Ew2w3YZ)/(24(12w2w3YZ - w1X2))
p26A* = (9I(-4w2w3YZ + w12X2) + Ew12X2 + 108Ew2w3YZ)/(24(12w2w3YZ - w1X2))
where I = (S - w1X - 2w2Y - 2w3Z) and E = (9I2 + 24(14w2w3YZ - w12X2))1/2.
These equilibrium expressions apply for product positions that satisfy 2(w1X + w3Z) ≤ p26A* -
p16A* + S < 2(w3Z + w2Y). The LHS of this inequality is true when (G5) fails while the RHS
is true when
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3S - E ≤ 6w3Z + 6w2Y - 9w1X. (G6)
Case 7A: The first order conditions yield three solutions. After eliminating the complex
roots, the equilibrium prices are given by:
p17A* = (128T2 - 11FT + 128F2)/(15F), p27A* = (T2 + TF + F2)/(15F)
where T = (2w1X + 2w2Y + 2w3Z - S) and
F = (T3 + 600w1w2w3XYZ + 20(3w1w2w3XYZ(T3 + 300w1w2w3XYZ)1/2)1/3.
These equilibrium expressions apply for product positions that satisfy 2(w2Y + w3Z) ≤ p27A* -
p17A* + S < 2(w3Z + w2Y + w1X). While the RHS is always true, the other condition LHS is true
if condition (G6) fails. This condition together with w1X ≤ w2Y ≤ (w1X + w2Y) ≤w3Z, define
region R7A.
4.3 Product Equilibrium
We now establish the subgame perfect equilibrium positions of firms. With subgame-
perfection, firms anticipate the equilibrium prices in the subgames. We can write profits in the
location stage as
Πi(θ1, θ2) ≡ Πi(p1*(θ1, θ2), p2*(θ1, θ2), θ1, θ2), i = 1, 2.
Thus a change in location has two effects on profits: a direct effect, and an indirect effect through
prices.
As in two dimensions, we find that maximal differentiation on all attributes, i.e., max-
max-max is not an equilibrium for any set of attribute weights. The proof is presented in an
appendix to an unabridged working paper version of this article available from the authors upon
request. In particular, we find that, at the equilibrium locations, the two firms are maximally
differentiated on only one attribute and are minimally differentiated on the rest. That is,
the subgame-perfect location-price equilibria are always of the type max-min-min or min-max-min
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or min-min-max. Depending upon the ratio of the weights, there are one, two, or three locational
equilibria (and their mirror images).
The first candidate equilibrium is (x1*, y1*, z1*) = (1/2, 1/2, 0), (x2*, y2*, z2*) = (1/2, 1/2,
1), i.e., firms are located in the middle of the horizontal planes of the cube, implying minimum
differentiation on the x and the y attributes. We call this the min-min-max equilibrium. The
second candidate is (x1**, y1**, z1**) = (1/2, 0, 1/2), (x2**, y2**, z2**) = (1/2, 1, 1/2). We call this
min-max-min equilibrium. The final candidate equilibrium is given by (x1***, y1***, z1***) = (0,
1/2, 1/2), (x2***, y2***, z2***) = (1, 1/2, 1/2). We name this the max-min-min equilibrium. We
can show that
1) The min-min-max equilibrium given by θ1* = (1/2, 1/2, 0), θ2* = (1/2, 1/2, 1), holds when
the weights satisfy w3/w1 ≥ 0.406 and w3/w2 ≥ 0.406.
2) The min-max-min equilibrium, given by the positions θ1** = (1/2, 0, 1/2), θ2** = (1/2, 1,
1/2), holds when w2/w1 ≥ 0.406 and w2/w3 ≥ 0.406.
3) The max-min-min equilibrium, given by the locations θ1*** = (0, 1/2, 1/2), θ2*** = (1, 1/2,
1/2), holds when w1/w2 ≥ 0.406 and w1/w3 ≥ 0.406.
The method of proof is summarized as follows. Suppose that firm 2 is located at (x2*,
y2*, z2*) = (1/2, 1/2, 1). We identify the direction in which profits of firm 1 increase as its
location changes by calculating the (vector) gradient of profits DΠ1. We do this by evaluating
analytic expressions for DΠ1. We identify locations for firm 1 that represent a local maximum,
minimum, or saddle point of its profit function. Let w1 < w2. We find that, when w3 is large
such that w3/w2 ≥ 1 and w3/w1 ≥ 1, there is only one local maximum of Π1, at θ1 = (1/2, 1/2,
0); therefore it is also a global maximum (in x1, y1 and z1) of the profit function Π1. It
follows that for w3/w2 ≥ 1 and w3/w1 ≥ 1, location (1/2, 1/2, 0) is the best response to
(1/2,1/2,1). For the same range of weight ratios, by symmetry with respect to the horizontal
plane passing through (1/2,1/2,1/2), θ2* = (1/2, 1/2, 1) is the global best response to (1/2, 1/2,
0). Thus, for this range of weight ratios, min-min-max is an equilibrium.
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Given that firm 2 is located at θ2* = (1/2, 1/2, 1), when w3 is smaller so that the
weights satisfy w3/w1 > 1 and 0.406 < w3/w2 < 1, there are two local maxima of firm 1’s
profits, at θ1* = (1/2, 1/2, 0) and θ1** = (1/2, 0, 1/2). Let the "middle location" profits of firm
1 be Π1(M) ≡ Π1(1/2, 1/2, 0) and let the "left" profits be Π1(L) ≡ Π1(1/2, 0, 1/2). For the
above range of weight ratios, Π1(M) > Π1(L); therefore (x1*, y1*, z1*) = (1/2, 1/2, 0) is the
(global) best reply of firm 1 to (x2*, y2*, z2*) = (1/2, 1/2, 1). By symmetry then, (x2*, y2*, z2*)
= (1/2, 1/2, 1) is the global best response to (x1*, y1*, z1*) = (1/2, 1/2, 0); therefore min-min-max
is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
When w3 is reduced further, either A: 0 ≤ w3/w2 ≤ 0.406 and w3/w1 > 1, or B: 0.406 <
w3/w2 < 1 and 0.406 < w3/w1 < 1 is first satisfied. Consider first the relationships in A. When
the weights satisfy inequalities A, firm 1’s profit function has two local maxima corresponding
to the "left" and "middle" locations described above. In contrast to the previous case, in this
situation, Π1(M) < Π1(L); therefore, θ1** = (1/2, 0, 1/2) is the best reply to (1/2, 1/2, 1).
However, θ2* = (1/2, 1/2, 1) is not the best reply to (1/2, 0, 1/2). This is established as follows.
Let firm 1 be at (1/2, 0, 1/2). The problem of the choice of location by firm 2 is symmetric to
the analogous problem of firm 1. From the view point of firm 2, the relative weights are w2/w1
> 1 and w2/w3 > 2.463 > 1. It follows from previous arguments (made for firm 1) that (1/2,
1, 1/2) is a global best reply to (1/2, 0, 1/2). Therefore (1/2, 1/2, 1) is not the best reply to
(1/2, 0, 1/2) and min-min-max is not an equilibrium while min-max-min is an equilibrium when
inequalities A hold.
Consider next the relationships in B: 0.406 < w3/w2 < 1 and 0.406 < w3/w1 < 1. When
inequalities B are satisfied, there are three local maxima for firm 1’s profit function. These
correspond to the "middle", and "left" locations defined above and a "right" location given by
θ1*** = (0, 1/2, 1/2). Here the best response is the "middle" location (1/2, 1/2, 0). Hence,
min-min-max is an equilibrium when the weights satisfy conditions B.
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When w3 is lowered so that the weights satisfy 0 < w3/w2 ≤ 0.406 and 0.406 < w3/w1
< 1, there are three local maxima for firm 1’s profit function. The global maximum is at the
"left" location, i.e, (1/2, 0, 1/2). Once, firm 1 is at the "left" location, then as shown above, (1/2,
1/2, 1) is no longer the global maximum for firm 2. Firm 2 has an incentive to be at (1/2, 1, 1/2)
and min-min-max is no longer a subgame perfect equilibrium. Finally, when 0 < w3/w2 ≤ 0.406
and 0 < w3/w1 ≤ 0.406, as above, there are three local maxima, but the "left" location for firm
1 is the global maximum, leading to the min-max-min locational equilibrium.
The above argument characterized conditions when min-min-max is an equilibrium. Notice
that in the entire discussion above, we assumed w1 < w2. Hence, under all conditions, the global
maxima for firm 1’s profits were either at the "left" or the "middle" location. When w2 ≤ w1,
we can show that the global maxima would be either at the "right" or the "middle" location.
Finally, by repeating the entire argument described above, but focussing instead on the
weight ratios w2/w1 and w2/w3, we can characterize the conditions under which min-max-min
is an equilibrium. By focussing on w1/w2 and w1/w3 instead, we can characterize the
conditions on the weights for which max-min-min is an equilibrium.
Putting all these together, the regions of existence of these equilibria can easily be
illustrated on the three dimensional simplex in Figure 4, where w1 + w2 + w3 = 1, w1, w2, w3
≥ 0. On segment AC define the points D and D′ such that (AD)/(DC) = (CD′)/(AD′) = 0.406,
with similar definitions of E, E′, F, and F′ on segments AB and BC. The region of the weights
w = (w1, w2, w3) ∈ (CDHF′) that leads to a min-min-max equilibrium is shaded. Similarly, w
∈ (AE′KD′) leads to a max-min-min equilibrium, and w ∈ (BFME) leads to a min-max-min
equilibrium. Notice that, roughly speaking, each equilibrium has maximal differentiation in the
dimension that corresponds to the highest weight. Further, when the weights are roughly similar
and fall in the central hexagon (MGHIKL), all three equilibria exist. In regions where two
weights are high but the third weight is low, two equilibria exist, each with maximal
differentiation in the dimension that corresponds one of the two high weights. For example, for
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w ∈ (DGMLD′), min-min-max and max-min-min are both equilibria. In regions where only one
weight is large (close to the vertices) only one equilibrium exists -- the one that differentiates
maximally in the dimension the large weight. For example, for w ∈ (CD′LF) only the max-
min-min equilibrium exists.
At each of equilibrium, both firms charge equal prices and share the market equally. This
pattern of equilibrium positions confirms our understanding that in multidimensional spaces, firms
seek to differentiate their offerings on one dimension only in order to reduce the impact of price
competition. Once products are differentiated maximally in one dimension, firms assume
identical (central) positions on the other attributes.11
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have examined product positioning and pricing in a multi-attribute
framework. We derived subgame-perfect equilibrium positions and associated prices for a
duopoly. In one dimension, maximal differentiation holds as shown in D’Aspremont et al.
(1979). We find that, in two dimensions, there are two equilibria when all consumers consider
the two attributes as equally important. In each of these equilibria, firms are maximally
differentiated on one attribute and minimally differentiated on other. Moreover, when firms are
minimally differentiated on one attribute, they occupy central positions on that attribute. We also
find that when attributes are differentially weighted by the consumers, so that one attribute has
significantly greater importance than the other, only a single equilibrium remains. In this
equilibrium firms maximally differentiate on the more important attribute and occupy central
positions on the other attribute.
In moving from two to three dimensions we showed that the essential character of the
equilibrium does not change. In particular, at the three-dimensional equilibrium, firms are
maximally differentiated on one dimension only. In three dimensions, depending on the
importance that consumers place in each attribute, there is one, two, or three equilibria. In each
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equilibrium, firms are maximally differentiated on one attribute and minimally differentiated on
the other two. An equilibrium with maximal differentiation in a certain dimension occurs when
consumers place sufficient importance to the corresponding attribute. Thus, if consumers place
importance only to the first attribute, the equilibrium is max-min-min, i.e., it has maximal
differentiation in the first dimension only. When consumers place importance on the second
attribute as well, the min-max-min equilibrium occurs too. Further, when consumers place
importance on the third attribute as well, the min-min-max equilibrium occurs in addition to the
other two. Thus, for example, when all attributes are weighted equally, all three equilibria (max-
min-min, min-max-min, and min-min-max) exist.
That the character of the equilibrium is stable is not surprising. Both the two-and three-
dimensional cases use the preference function defined in expression (1) in section 2. In fact, the
two-dimensional case can be viewed as a special case of the three-dimensional one where w3
= 0. If only the most important of three attributes is differentiated, then knowledge of the three-
dimensional solution implies the two-dimensional and the one-dimensional ones. Reasoning in
the reverse direction, if a product is only differentiated in the most important attribute, then we
would expect not only the third, but any additional attributes to be minimally differentiated.
Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to prove that conjecture.
Up to this point we have used the unit square in two dimensions (and the unit cube in
three) as both the space of location of consumers’ ideal points and the space of product offerings.
Keeping the consumers space and preference distribution the same, we now allow the space of
product offerings to be significantly larger, so that each attribute can range from 1/2 -k to 1/2
+ k, with k arbitrarily large. The character of equilibrium remains unchanged, with maximal
differentiation in only one dimension. In that dimension, products occupy positions outside the
consumers’ space. The equilibrium locations in two dimensions are (-1/4, 1/2) for firm 1 and
(5/4, 1/2) for firm 2. In three dimensions, for example, the max-min-min equilibrium is at (-1/4,
1/2, 1/2) and (5/4, 1/2, 1/2).
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An important aspect of our results is the multiplicity of equilibria in both the two and the
three-dimensional models. When consumers value all attributes roughly equally, all locational
n-tuples with maximal differentiation in one dimension and minimal differentiation in all others,
are equilibria. As more weight is put on a particular dimension, equilibria get eliminated one by
one until we reach a unique equilibrium. This shows that advertising can have a very important
role in eliminating certain equilibria. If advertising can get consumers to pay more attention to
a certain product attribute, and perhaps weigh it more heavily in preference formation, it can
determine which of several equilibria will hold. Therefore, a firm with a unique ability to
produce a product consistent with one of the equilibrium positions will certainly want to advertize
in an attempt to direct the market to that equilibrium. It is noteworthy that this depends only on
the relative importances of the different attributes and not on the relative preferences of
individual consumers for different levels of any specific attribute.
There are a number of directions in which these results can be extended.12 First, there
is the obvious extension to higher dimensional spaces. Are the equilibrium locations of a n-
dimensional attribute spaces only differentiated in one dimension?13 Second, how do the
locational results fare when there are more than two competitors? Third, what for what classes
of distributions can we extend our duopoly positioning results? All these are very interesting
questions that we leave for further research.
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Appendix: Demand Definitions for the Three-Dimensional Model
We describe the demand expressions and regions pertaining to Scenario 1B, first and then
describe the relationships among the remaining scenarios.
Scenario 1B:
Case 1B: when 0 ≤ L ≤ 2w1X, demand for firm 1 is D11B = D11A;
Case 2B: when 2w1X ≤ L ≤ 2w2Y, demand for firm 1 is D12B = D12A;
Case 3B: when 2w2Y ≤ L ≤ 2w3Z, demand is D13B = D13A;
Case 4B: when 2w3Z ≤ L ≤ 2(w1X + w2Y), D14B = D13A - (L - 2w3Z))3/H;
Case 5B: when 2(w1X + w2Y) ≤ L ≤ 2(w1X + w3Z), D15B = D15A;;
Case 6B: when 2(w1X + w3Z) ≤ L ≤ 2(w2Y + w3Z), we have D16B = D16A; and
Case 7B: when 2(w2Y + w3Z) ≤ L ≤ 2(w1X + w2Y + w3Z), D17B = D17A.
As is evident from the above, the two scenarios differ across only one demand expression.
However, the regions of the product space associated with cases 3, 4, and 5, are different across
the two scenarios.
We now show how the remaining scenarios can be obtained from the two that were
analyzed above. We define transformation rules that we use on the above derived demand
expressions and price inequalities so as to obtain the corresponding expressions in the other
scenarios. The transformation rules are as follows:
rep2 = (w1X → w1X, w2Y → w3Z, w3Z → w2Y); rep3 = (w1X → w2Y, w2Y → w1X, w3Z→w3Z);
rep4 = (w1X → w2Y, w2Y → w3Z, w3Z → w1X); rep5 = (w1X → w3Z, w2Y → w1X, w3Z→w2Y);
and rep6 = (w1X → w3Z, w2Y → w2Y, w3Z → w1X).
These rules work as follows. In order to obtain the seven cases of demand and the
associated price domains for Scenario 2A, we apply rep2 on the corresponding demand
expressions and price domains of Scenario 1A. For example, the demand expression for case 1
of Scenario 2A can be obtained by simultaneously substituting in D11A above, w1X in place of
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w1X, w3Z in place of w2Y, and w2Y in place of w3Z. These replacement rules follow from
the geometric symmetry associated with the sides of the unit cube. Similarly, Scenario 2B can
be analyzed by applying rep2 on the corresponding expressions of Scenario 1B. The other
scenarios can be analyzed in an analogous manner.
FIGURE CAPTIONS
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Figure 2 - Gradient of Profit Function for Firm 1. Firm 2 is Located at (1/2, 1). page 9.
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1. See Hotelling (1929), Vickrey (1964), D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Salop
(1979), Economides (1984), Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992), among others in
economics and Hauser and Shugan (1983), Moorthy (1988) and Kumar and Sudarshan (1988)
in marketing.
2. See Neven (1985) for a discussion of the necessary conditions for minimal differentiation.
Also note that the failure of minimal differentiation does not necessarily imply maximal
differentiation. D’Aspremont et al. (1979) establish a maximal differentiation equilibrium in
a one-dimensional variant of Hotelling (1929) by assuming a quadratic disutility of distance
(transportation cost) function. Economides (1986b) establishes intermediate (neither minimum
nor maximal) differentiation equilibria for a disutility of distance (transportation cost) function
of the form da, 5/3 < a < 1.26. Economides (1984) establishes intermediate differentiation
equilibria by allowing for a finite maximal utility (reservation price) for a differentiated good
in the original linear disutility of distance function of Hotelling (1929).
3. See Salop (1979), Economides (1989), and Rao and Steckel (1995).
4. This is in contrast with analysis on the interaction of price and location competition in
multidimensional settings without explicit locational determination as in Economides (1986a),
or locational determination in Ben Akiva et al. (1989), or two-dimensional models that can be
reduced to one-dimensional competition as Lane (1981), Hauser and Shugan (1983), Hauser
(1988), and Ansari, Economides and Ghosh (1994).
5. Models of product differentiation that use a quadratic utility loss function include
D’Aspremont et al. (1979), Neven (1985), and Economides (1989). Ideal point models in
marketing assume that preferences are negatively related to the square of the Euclidean
distance between the product and the consumer’s ideal point (see, e.g. Green and Srinivasan
(1978)).
6. Positive constant marginal costs lead to formally equivalent results. The first order
conditions with positive marginal costs are formally equivalent to the first order conditions
with zero costs if we redefine prices to be price-cost differences.
7. Because of the complexity of the problem, we solved this system of equations numerically.
While we were unable to obtain closed form solutions, we implemented our numerical routine
with a wide variety of starting values so that we have maximum confidence in our results.
8. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the equivalence.
9. Essentially the indirect effect is through the price of the opponent: dΠi/dxi = ∂Πi/∂xi +
(∂Πi/∂pi)(dpi*/dxi) + (∂Πi/∂pj)(dpj*/dxi) = ∂Πi/∂xi + (∂Πi/∂pj)(dpj*/dxi), since ∂Πi/∂pi = 0 at the
Nash equilibrium of the price subgame.
10. The method of our proof is detailed in the product equilibrium section later in the paper.
11. Finally, we must note that we have not shown that these are the only locational equilibria.
However, we were unable to locate any other equilibrium despite extensive search.
12. It should be clear that the Principle of Max-Min-Min differentiation is dependent on the
assumptions implicit in our framework. As these assumptions are relaxed the character of the
equilibrium may indeed change. For example, in a two-dimensional spacial model with one
dimension providing linear disutility and the other providing quadratic, Ben-Akiva, De Palma
and Thisse (1989) show that the likelihood of minimal differentiation in the second dimension
varies as a function of the absolute values of the weights of the utility function, the size of
the market, the degree of heterogeneity in the market, and the number of firms. Some of
these characteristics are fixed in our model. In particular, we only allow two firms.
Additionally, the size of the market and the degree of heterogeneity are fixed in our model by
the assumptions that the product space is a unit square (in two dimensions) or a unit cube
(ion three) and that consumers are uniformly distributed over it. While the Ben-Akiva et al.
(1989) results come from a different model than ours, they suggest that the max-min and the
max-min-min results might vanish if the product space or other aspects of the problem were
altered. These are questions for future research.
13. This idea was suggested to us independently as a conjecture by Jacques Thisse.
